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"Philosophical theology" is a descriptor coined in the
1960s by the contributors to a group endeavor, entitled New Essays
in Philosophical Theology, which meant to bring the tools of analytic
philosophy to bear on topics long recognized to be theological in
character, yet with considerable philosophical resonance* It was sub-
sequently adopted by those who wished to do just that: bring their
philosophical expertise to issues theological, without being thereby
constrained to consider the traditional "preambles to faith" that had
become the stock in trade of a discipline called "natural theology":
the existence of God, the possibility of divine revelation, and the
capacity to discourse at all about such transcendent objects.
The model operative here had been one in which reason was
invoked to establish the truth of certain claims that were deemed to
be presupposed to a reasonable assent of faith. And since reason was
supposed to function with evidence available to all, its deliverances
were considered "natural," while those of faith were "supernatural,"
indicating that something more than evidence was at work in the
assent of faith. Whatever the preoccupations of the contributors to
the New Essays symposium, others of us who have adopted that title
for our work wanted not only to expand the range of theological topics
available for philosophical inquiry, but also to intimate a new model
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for the relation of reason and faith. Rather than a stepwise pattern that
suggested a foundational approach to matters of faith, we preferred to
direct our attention to the tradition of Christian theology, as one in
which the community had availed itself of reason from the outset in
the elaboration of its faith and its own self-understanding. By attend-
ing to the explicitly philosophical contributions to that endeavor,
those who style themselves "philosophical theologians" have tried to
bring some distinctive critical tools to assessing the larger endeavor of
Christian theology and especially to adjudicating its claims to truth.
Moreover, there are convincing hermeneutic arguments that the me-
dievals never considered the discussions involving the "preambles to
faith" to be foundational in character, but rather to be a retrospective
inquiry into the presuppositions required for any consideration of the
truth of the articles of faith.1
It is the assessing and adjudicating role of philosophy, however,
that deserves a fresh look today, in the light of recent reflections
on the role of tradition in guiding inquiry, and specifically out of
respect for the primarily theological focus of the work in this field.
For if the mode is expressly philosophical, the issues are theological,
and theology operates far more historically than many philosophers
are accustomed to proceed. The notions that proved crucial to the
early doctrinal formulations of Nicaea and Chalcedon, for example,
were themselves forged over three centuries of debate, in which their
meaning and intent were shaped to the specific role they were to play
in that discussion. Apprising oneself of this conceptual development
means entering into the theological tradition itself, at least enough to
follow the reasoning presented for modifying the philosophical terms
in play, so that the discourse will be assessed in its own terms rather
than presuming it to be employing a putatively neutral idiom. Absent
such efforts, we cannot presume we are discussing the theological
issues we set out to examine, but only a procrustean version of them
that we take to be "coherent" within prevailing horizons. But one
of the salient contributions of theological questions to philosophy
has ever been to challenge the adequacy of current horizons. It is
in the interest of good philosophy as well as accurate theology to
1. Guy de Broglie, "Le vrai sens de preambula fidei" Gregorianum 34 (1953): 345-
388.
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show how the criteria of assessment are inherently dialectical in a
merged discipline like "philosophical theology." What follows intends
to illustrate that contention with respect to an avowal shared by Jews,
Christians, and Muslims alike: that the universe comes forth from God
freely and deliberately.
In the medieval discussion, the operative counterpoint was the
scheme of necessary emanation from the One, in which all-that-is
flows from that source in much the same way as many premises may
be deduced from a single axiom. What the Bible and the Qur'an were
presumed to say, however, was that the creator who freely bestowed
those revelations also brought forth the universe as an utterly free
gift: neither responding to any need in the creator nor presuming any
stuff with which to work. The resulting challenge to philosophy is
to find a conceptuality that will articulate how all'that-is is freely
originated and exists in dependence on the One. This is indeed
an exercise in theology, since those who don't accept this story of
origination could hardly be bothered. Yet it is a philosophical exercise
as well, since the issues involved are inescapably metaphysical: there
could be no witnesses of such an origination. I shall contrast two
ways of articulating this situation, arguing that one of them is more
compatible with the original assertion of the revelatory sources, and
for that reason ought to recommend to us the ontology employed. In
other words, rather than simply assess the adequacy of a revelatory
statement according to our philosophical horizons, I want to show
how the faith horizon can also exercise a normative role in leading
believers to prefer one ontology to another.
It is commonly presumed that the alternative to a necessary emana-
tion of the universe from its source is a picture of the creator selecting
which universe to create. This picture coheres with our commonly
held presumption that choosing is the paradigm for the exercise of
freedom. It seems that if there were no choice in the matter, the
creator would be constrained, and this universe would be the only
universe possible, given the creator it has. I shall argue against the
picture, as well as the metaphysics that it suggests: one that privileges
possibility over actuality. I will do so from the perspective of affirming
the free creation of the universe from the One. Once we are alerted to
the fact that this universe is indeed a free gift, rather than the given
context of all that we can say or do, we will be even more concerned
than Aristotle was to make of individual existing things our paradigm
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for what-is. The utter freedom of creation not only denies any need
on the part of the creator, but also any prior constraints on the part
of the world-to-be-created. There is no possibility preceding God's
free origination, except by reference to the power of God.2 So there
are no "possible worlds" from which the creator selects this one, as
though God's action in creating were primarily a matter of will and
indeed of choice.
It is true that many who so construe creation do not think of
the presence of such "worlds" as a prior constraint on God, since
the worlds are rather conceived as products of the divine mind, one
of which the divine will "actualizes." Indeed, nothing would seem
to enhance the scope of the divine intellect so much as to think
of God knowing in detail all possible configurations of all possible
states of affairs, necessary and contingent, and selecting this one!
Nothing, that is, except the thought that some of these states of
affairs will involve actions of free individuals, so that knowing their
outcome would presume a determinacy unavailable before that person
existed and performed the action. Actiones sunt suppositorum, as the
medieval axiom had it: actions result from existing individuals. To put
it another way: possible configurations may give us a scenario, but not
a history. And we all know that scenarios are parasitic on histories.
The anticipated responses of standard scenarios are distilled from what
we know of behavior in the past. Possibility follows actuality when
one speaks of "worlds," even if in a constituted world, potentiality
precedes actuality. Yet it remains true, doesn't it, that what-is could
have been otherwise? Isn't that what "contingency" comes to? In
a universe that is merely given, this would be the operative sense
of "contingency": understanding that some states of affairs in the
world could indeed have happened otherwise, while others could
not. Indeed, distinguishing invariant from variable features of the
world is part of our basic orientation. But when the universe is a
free gift, there is another level of contingency beyond that which
presupposes the actual configurations and then recognizes that many
of them are in fact variable. It is rather the level that acknowledges
that all this might not be at all. Such a recognition represents another
level of contingency because even what happens by "natural necessity"
2. Thomas Aquinas Summa theobgiae 1.46.1 ad 1.
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may yet be said to be contingent in this sense. In fact, "no creature
can be said to be absolutely necessary, for it is necessary only on
the supposition that the divine will has unchangeably decreed its
preservation."3 For "just as before things existed on their own it was
in the creator's power for them to exist, so now that they do exist on
their own it is in the creator's power for them not to exist."4
So it seems that the presence of a free creator adds a dimension
to ordinary discourse about possibility and necessity, emphasizing that
they are modalities of existing, which is the free gift of the creator.
"Just as bringing things into existence depends on God's will, so also
preserving them in existence. For [God] preserves them in existence
only by perpetually giving existence to them, and were he therefore
to withdraw his activity from them all things . . . would fall back into
nothingness."5 This statement of Aquinas, the sense of which he
attributes to Augustine, shows how crucial it is whether one treats
the divine origination as a mere presupposition or as a continuing
presence. If the originating activity is but presupposed, the universe
can be considered, like that of the Greeks, a given. If that activity is
indeed pervasive, however, "actuality" takes on a new valence. One
may indeed speak about how things might have been, but as possibili-
ties. They remain relative to the power of God to create them, and so
say little more than that things could have been otherwise than the
way in which they are. How much otherwise is a disputed question,
as recent discussion surrounding the "universal constants" attests.
What appears from this perspective to be a fruitless enterprise is
to extrapolate randomly from the world that we know into other
"possible worlds." The inverse of the complaints of empirical philoso-
phers regarding "God-talk" recurs in this context: such flights of fancy
presume that too many of the implications from the actual world to
remain as we alter one feature after another of the world we think
we know. How little we really know of the intricacies of this world
is dramatized by the "universal constants" discussion. In fact, this is
the only world we know; we remain quite ignorant of those features
which make it into a unified, functioning whole, in short, a world.
Aquinas called this pervasive and transcendental feature the "order of
3. Thomas Aquinas Quaestiones disputatae de potentia 3.17 ad 3.
4. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.9.2.
5. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.9.2.
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the universe as a whole [bonum ordinis universi]" and considered it to be
the "primary intent" of the creator,6 Since the various sciences have
only begun to explore the synergies proper to ecological interaction,
we rightly confess a large degree of unknowing in regard to this order,
yet we can perceive enough to marvel at its intricacies. Once again,
the positive valence of actuality strikes us forcibly. Even while we
know that this world "could be otherwise," we remain unable to
identify those features which make it into the world that it is or
to tell why they do so. We are reminded of the rhetoric of al-Ghazali
and Maimonides in the face of an ostensibly philosophically superior
scheme of "necessary emanation": what one really ought to marvel at
is the conjuncture of things that we cannot explain yet which make
this world what it is, for these patterns—unpredictable by the sciences
available to them—display the wisdom of the creator.7
Indeed, this accent on the world in which we live as the world
that is the free gift of the creator (and so the only bona fide "world"
that we know) calls into question the utility of modal logic and of
"possible world" semantics more generally to articulate the relation
of creator to creation. These "worlds" remind one of alternative em-
anation schemes, replacing "necessary" with "possible," yet retaining
the sense that God is "in" each of them. In fact, the "distinction"
of creator from creation is what is at stake—what Ibn Sina had
identified as the bifurcation in being between necessary and possible.^
This represented the first attempt of an Islamic philosopher to factor
in the difference that an originated universe could make to one's
metaphysics. The device that he employed was to distinguish essence
from existence in such wise that everything other than the First
received its existence from that First, whose uniqueness was assured
by the fact that its essence [dhat] was identified with existing.9 So
6. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol 1.15.2.
7. Al-Ghazalί, AUmaqsάd al-asnά ft shark ma'άnΐ asma' Allah al-husna, 'aWadl',
translated as AUGhazalt on the Ninety-nine Beautiful Names of God (Cambridge: Islamic
Text Society, 1992); Moses Maimonides Guide of the Perplexed 2.19, 2.24, 3.13.
8. See Burrell, "Essence and Existence: Avicenna and Greek Philosophy," MIDEO
17 (1986): 3-66. For the sense of 'distinction' here, see Robert Sokolowski, The God
of Faith and Reason (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982).
9. Fazlur Rahman, "Essence and Existence in Avicenna," in Mediaeval and Renais-
sance Studies [London] 4 (1958): 1-16.
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while Avicenna regarded "possibles" as presupposed to the activity
of emanation, what distinguished the necessary being from all that
might be (i.e., what is merely possible in itself), as well as from what
exists (i.e., what is possible in itself yet necessary from another), is also
what makes it unique. While it lacks existence as something "coming
to it," it nevertheless enjoys existing as what "belongs to it"—the
etymological root of 'dhat', the term Alfarabi had already coined for
God's unique essence.10
Ibn Sina's account of God's necessity and the world's contingency
was bedeviled by two interrelated factors. First, there was his way of
characterizing existing as "what comes to something" and hence an
"accident" (since the Arabic expression for 'accident' bears the same
relation to the root verb as our term does to the Latin verb 'accidere',
'to come to'). There was, second, his identification of existing with the
"necessity" that obtains among existents by virtue of their emanation
from the One. These are connected in that the vague characterization
of existing as "what comes to something" makes it into an attribute,
which attribute is then identified with a place in a formal scheme. So
what we recognize as contingency in existing things, their "precarious"
status as existents, is translated into a derivative form of necessity,
namely their place in a necessary scheme. What distinguishes all such
items from the One that is necessary is simply that each of them is
what it is already (as it were) as a merely possible, whereas God alone
is such that it could not not be. Now the force of existing as "coming
to something" emerges: the item in question is already constituted
"before" existing, so that the characterization is relatively apposite,
despite the self-referential problems which obviously arise when one
so defines existing.
Now we may see the connection between Avicenna's scheme and
"possible worlds" treatments of these issues. "Possibles" in both cases
are taken to be identifiable prior to their existing (or being actualized)
—indeed, to be exhaustively so. (There are subtle differences whether
one is referring to "objects" or to "states of affairs," but these are quite
compatible with the similarities we shall develop here.) So on both
counts, "actualizing" may be thought of as the emerging of something
10. See Burrell, Knowing the Unknowable God (Notre Dame, IncL: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1986), p. 16 (Farabi), 39-40 (Ibn Sina).
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into full-blown reality, or alternatively, as existence (or actualization)
"coming to" it, where the it is already given. So existence is, in
the current jargon, "an on/off property: either you're there or you're
not."11 It should be immediately evident how such a notion jars with
the assertion shared by Jews, Christians, and Muslims of a creator who
brings all-that-is into being. The picture operative here is more like
a demiurge who, instead of fashioning out of pre-existent material,
selects among a plethora of "possibles." With the Jewish, Christian,
or Muslim God, however, the "possibles" could indeed be the product
of the divine intellect, so nothing would be postulated as extraneous
to the creator (except perhaps those "necessary truths" that would
have to attend all possible configurations). So the mere assertion of a
creator who is not a demiurge does not decide the matter. What does
come nearer to deciding it is the conception of creation with which
one is operating. Since this is usually quite implicit, the alternatives
deserve to be developed.
If the creator is the source of all-that-is, and hence of the per-
fections of things, the creator will be the source not merely of their
"existence" (in the "on/off sense), but of all that emanates from their
existing. Operations above all are the sign of something's existing, so
it follows that the initial and grounding perfection is existence itself.
If that be the case, this utterly "non-qualitative property" of existence
will be the "proper effect of the first and most universal cause, which
is God."12 From that divine activity will flow all that comes to be from
such creatures. Far from being an initial "floor," an "on/off property,"
what the act of creation bestows, in creating this world, is what makes
it to be and to be a world: the existential order that is the only matrix
within which action occurs. Since this bestowal is free (by the shared
belief of Jews, Christians, and Muslims), we are also led to believe that
such a One could have created otherwise, as well as not having created
at all. Nothing whatsoever licenses us to picture the freedom to have
11. Christopher Hughes, On a Complex Theory of a Simple God: An Investigation in
Aquinas' Philosophical Theology (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989),
p. 27.
12. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.45.5. For the notion of "non-qualitative
property," see R. M. Adams, "Theories of Actuality," Nous 8 (1974): 211-231,
reprinted in The Possible and the Actual, ed. Michael Loux (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1979), pp. 190-209.
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created otherwise as a selection among determinate "possibles." In
fact, much leads us in another direction: the inscrutability of the
divine wisdom, recently reinforced by astrophysical reflection on the
"universal constants," might make us wonder just how different this
universe could be, in its very structure, and remain a universe.
However we may decide that (undecidable?) question, the presence
of human freedom would follow as a perfection utterly consonant
with the existential order of a universe conceived as the gift of a free
creator. Such a One would be empowered to create existents whose
operations were natural as well as others whose operations were also
intentional. In fact, the natures of intentional beings would be to be
free. Just as the creator who is the cause of being "imparts to creatures
also the dignity of causing,"13 so also that same creator makes some
such creatures free agents. That need not inhibit the certitude of
providence, for "to be necessary or contingent are corollaries to being
as such."14 This last assertion is the crucial challenge to a metaphysics
able to articulate the scope of a creator of all-that-is, and to do so in a
way that also articulates "the distinction" as well. Such a One is not
"faced with" necessities any more than subverted by contingencies,
for this One need not "negotiate" the world it creates. What is also
needed is a manner of understanding this relationship that avoids the
spatial images connected with a "transcendence-immanence" scheme.
It would only be accurate to say that this One is "beyond" necessity-
contingency if we were also prepared to say that it is so because this
is the very One that sustains all-that-is in being, whether its mode of
being is necessary or contingent. So what is required, as James Ross
has been reminding us, is a way to articulate a "cause of being":
omnipotence is FORMALLY not the power to make states of affairs obtain
or to actualize the possible. It is the power to cause being ex nihilo.. . .
Its domain is realized with its exercise. What is possible ad extra is the
result of what God does. God's power has no exemplar objects, only a
perimeter (that is, finite being) plus a limit (that of internal consistency,
compatibility with divine being). God creates the kinds, the natures of
things, along with the things. And [God] settles for whaMnight-have-
been insofar as it is a consequence of what exists; for example, you might
have been wealthier. Thus, there is no mere possibility with content (for
13. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.22.3.
14. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.22.4 ad 3.
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example, "there might have been only Marticils, silicon-based percipients,
native to Mars"); there are only descriptions, actual and potential, that
might, for all we know so far, have been satisfied. They do not, however,
"pick out" any definite content that, if actual, would satisfy them. All
content ad extra is caused by God. In sum, God creates the possibility,
the impossibility, and counterfactuality that has content (real situations)
involving being other than God.15
Those who must begin with "possibilities" rather than with the
act of creation would locate what Ross calls "definite content" in the
"divine ideas," some of which the creator "actualizes" in creating this
world. They often appeal to Aquinas's treatment of "divine ideas"
to underscore their point.16 Yet their appeal tends to miss the deft
way in which Aquinas altered this neoplatonic legacy to subserve
his accentuating God's creative knowing as practical. It is only in the
measure that God is creator that there is need at all for ideas, since the
divine intellect as such has no need of "being informed by a plurality
of species" by which it knows.17 Indeed, divine simpleness would be
violated were that required. Yet once we speak of God freely creating,
then ideas become a convenient way for us to articulate the fact that
God creates deliberately, and the idea serves as "that which is known,
[as] the form of a house in the mind of the architect is something
understood by him, to the likeness of which he produces the form of
a house in the matter."18 It should be clear that Aquinas is employing
an analogy, and one which underscores the practical dimension of the
knowing associated with creating. It is in that context that he then
distinguishes two senses of 'idea', both of which he acknowledges to
be inherited from Plato: "as a principle of the production of things it
may be called an exemplar, and belongs to practical knowledge; as a
15. See James Ross, "God, Creator of Kinds and Possibilities: Requiescant universalia
ante res," in Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment, ed. Robert Audi and
William Wainwright (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 315-334,
especially p. 318; and Ross, "The Crash of Modal Metaphysics," Review of Metaphysics
43 (1989): 251-279.
16. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.15; Quaestiones disputatae de veritate 3.
17. See the discussion between William Alston, "Does God have Beliefs," Reli-
gious Studies 22 (1986): 287-306, and William Hasker, "Yes, God has Beliefs," 24
(1988): 385-394. Compare John Farthing, "The Problem of Divine Exemplarity in
St. Thomas," Thomist 49 (1985): 183-222.
18. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.15.2.
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principle of knowing, it is properly called a ratio, and can belong also
to speculative knowledge."19 This ratio "is related to all the things
God knows, even though they never come into existence; and to all
the things [God] knows in the rationes proper to each, and as known
by [God] in a speculative way."
This distinction Aquinas had already made in the previous ques-
tion, in asking "whether God has knowledge of non-existent things"?20
He distinguished there between two modes of knowing by their ob-
jects: of those things which were, are or will be, "all these God is
said to know by knowledge of vision," while of those "which can
be produced by God or by creatures, yet are not, were not, and
never will b e , . . . God is said to have . . . knowledge of simple under-
standing." The use of Vision' to name God's creating (or practical)
knowledge reflects the fact that "in ourselves things seen have a
separate existence outside the one who sees." Such items, then, are
present to God as items that God creates; the "others" need not
be so construed: in fact, what knowledge of simple understanding
amounts to is God's knowing "the divine essence . . . as it can be
participated in some degree of likeness by creatures."21 But in the
case of knowledge of vision, "God, in knowing [the divine] essence as
imitable in this particular way by this particular creature, knows [the
divine] essence as the nature and idea proper to that creature." This
knowing, which is practical, terminates in a particular creature with
its "proper nature," while the first terminates only in a "proper ratio"
indicating how the divine essence could indeed be participated. That
is why Aquinas calls it "knowledge of simple understanding" and why
he notes that it is speculative in character. It should be clear, then,
that Aquinas is not an "exemplarist," in the sense identified by Ross,
according to which God first knows in a determinate way all the
items God could create, and then chooses among them certain ones
to "actualize." Aquinas reserves the term 'exemplar' to the exercise of
divine practical knowing and so to those things which have existed, do
or will exist. Beyond terminology, the critical point is that the creator
need not be a platonist to create in a deliberate fashion. Aquinas's
treatment of "divine ideas" cannot be adduced as evidence for such
19. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.15.3.
20. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.14.9.
21. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.15.2.
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a contention; indeed it testifies to the contrary. But how may we
formulate that contrary more precisely?
By noting how Aquinas transformed Avicenna's observations about
"existing coming to" things into an ontology that privileges existing
over essence, as act of a potency. If existing is not the merest fact about
things, but rather the source of all their subsequent perfections, then
it will follow that existing is the "proper effect of the first and most
universal cause, which is God."22 Whatever else there is—natures,
powers, inclinations, habits, actions—is dependent upon those indi-
viduals' existing which embody them. It should be clear that 'existing'
here means just that. It is not the denatured 'existing in' found in
statements like "every object has existence in each world in which
it exists."23 For such statements reduce 'existing' to a "property. . .
essential to each object, and necessarily so," which property comes
down to an object's belonging to a "possible world," so that the
very point of Avicenna's original distinction is subverted, and one
is constrained to substitute a new word 'actuality' for 'existence' as
we normally use it. The alteration is far more than terminological, as
we have seen; it brings with it an ontology that privileges possibility
over actuality, and thereby makes it very difficult to understand what
'actuality' means, other than to identify the world that happens to
be from among all those which could be. ('Contingency' is given a
strong sense—this world just 'happens to be'—while the very being
of the world is given short shrift.)
Alternatively, if what-exists is all we have, and what-is-possible
is parasitic upon that, then another dimension is added to "contin-
gency." It is not merely that things might have been otherwise, or
that another "world" might have been "actualized," but that those
things which exist might not have existed at all. That there might
not have been anything at all was unthinkable to the Greeks, and
equally so, it seems, to purveyors of "possible worlds," for whom 'exists'
as we normally use it is a special case of 'exists in' (as in 'exists in a
possible world'). One can always suppose another "possible world." Yet
this difference is no doubt illustrative, for as Sokolowski insists, the
capacity to think "contingency" in this more radical sense is clearly
22. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.45.5.
23. These citations are from Alvin Plantinga, "Actualism and Possible Worlds,"
in The Possible and the Actual, ed. Loux, p. 261.
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a function of the affirmation of a free creation. "The world is now
understood as not having had to be, [which amounts to] the denial
that God . . . is part of or dependent on the world,... is glimpsed on
the margin of reason,... at the intersection of reason and faith."2^
With that "distinction" comes the corollary that God, as free creator,
is the cause of all-that-is, and of the modalities that follow upon being.
What we formulate as "necessities" are not thereby made arbitrary;
they depend on the divine nature rather than on the divine will, as
what God understands must be the case if the divine essence is to be
imitated by such a created nature. In that respect, necessities would
seem to function more like rules of inference or like the constraints of
matter, purpose, and appropriate agency in building something, than
like constituent parts of created things. Such formal features differ
from other constituents in that things are not made of them.
Moreover, if God's "necessity" is defined by what makes such a
creator unique, namely that God's very essence is tt>exist, then the
primacy of existing will be confirmed in the clearest way possible. The
One from which all-that-is comes to be exists in and by itself. What
it bestows in creating will be a share in that perfection of existing, so
that the very existence of the creature will consist in "a relation to
the creator as the origin of its existence."25 Even if the formulation
of necessity as "being true, or obtaining in, all possible worlds" were
an adequate account of the modal notion (which Ross challenges),26
it would hardly succeed in formulating what it is about God's being
necessary that further identifies such a One as the creator, indeed, as
the free creator of all-that-is. Perhaps that is more than one ought to
ask of such an account, but a characterization of God that required
a separate premise to assure that such a One is the origin of all-
that-is would hardly be adequate to articulate the faith of those who
believe in free creation. Some other metaphysical scheme is clearly
required. It must be able to characterize a One that need not create
and from which all that is emanates. Moreover, since this world is
the only world we know, and is deemed to be the one that God freely
creates, underscoring the primacy of existing as what individuates by
24. Sokolowski, God of Faith and Reason, pp. 34, 37, 39.
25. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.45.3.
26. Ross, "The Crash of Modal Metaphysics," p. 270.
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granting a participation in the divine act of existing offers itself as a
metaphysical corollary of the original faith.
Furthermore, identifying the existence of the creature as "a relation
to the creator," and hence as "what is more intimately and profoundly
interior to things than anything else,"2 7 including what makes each
thing to be what it is (its essence), goes a long way to overcoming the
imaginative bifurcation of transcendence-immanence. By reminding
us that the "proper effect" of the free creator in things will by defi-
nition transcend the causal order of creatures, we are also brought to
realize that this same effect will define what is most "intimately and
profoundly" interior to created things. The distinction of existence
from essence becomes the axial conceptual tool for articulating "the
distinction" of God from the world by formulating the relation of
creature to creator. Moreover, the conceptual obscurity of the key
notion of existing also follows from the scheme itself, for were the
"relation to the creator" in which created existing consists to be ac-
cessible in terms proper to the created universe itself, that is, if it were
identifiable as a feature of the world, then its transcendence would
be lost and "the distinction" elided. We see that the essence-existing
distinction, as formulated by Aquinas so as to extend Aristotle's axial
categories of potency-act, belongs to the same "logical neighborhood"
as "the distinction" itself. Avicenna's formulation of existing as some-
thing "coming to the essence" would be more accessible to reason
alone, however incoherent it may be seen to be. Aquίnas's distinction
seems to be as much "on the margin of reason" and hence "at the
intersection of reason and faith," as is "the distinction" of God from
the world.2 8
My reliance on Aquinas throughout is strategic rather than doctri-
nal. If the prime concern of philosophical theology is to elaborate the
essentials of a faith-tradition, with special attention to the so-called
27. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.8.1.
28. This remark takes a position on a controverted question among students
of Aquinas. See the debate between John Wippel and Joseph Owens in Wippel,
"Aquinas' Route to the Real Distinction: A note on De ente et essentia, ch. 4,"
Thomist 43 (1979): 279-295, with Owens's response, "Stages and Distinction in De
ente: A Rejoinder," Thomist 45 (1981): 99-123; followed by WippeFs reply in his
Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of
America Press, 1984), pp. 120-132.
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preambula fidei, then it could be argued that the most critical of these
is "the distinction" of God from the world. Everything turns on the
character of the divinity that one wishes to set forth as existing, as
revealing itself, and as guiding the terrestrial course of events. Much
of that character is decided in attempting to articulate that One as
the free creator of all-that-is. So it was that Aquinas, confronted
with an Islamic philosophical tradition that had compromised the
Qur'an's clear assertion of a free creation, yet emboldened by the
arguments of Moses Maimonides to the effect that no philosopher
had been able to demonstrate the "eternity of the universe," managed
to find a clear metaphysical way of characterizing such a divinity.
Beginning with a description of this One compatible with all three
traditions—"the beginning and end of all things and of reasoning
creatures especially"29—he was able to transform Ibn Sina's version
of "the distinction" into the more coherent formula of existing as
the act to which any essence was in potency. He thereby established
"the First" as that One which had no need to create, being its own
existence. The One whose very nature is to-exist will, by that fact
alone, merit the transcendence that Plotinus could claim for his
"One" only by locating it "beyond being," since everything-that-is
exists in such a way as to be distinct from its existing. Moreover, by
identifying the divine essence with its existing, Aquinas succeeded
both in distinguishing God's existing from that of every thing-that-is
and in relating the creator to all creatures, as participants in that
singular act of existing which is God.
One question alone seemed to be left hanging for Aquinas, as he
negotiated a path for faith through the philosophical universe of his
day. The One of Plotinus (and of Avicenna) was not so much moved
by need to emanate the universe, as by an inner necessity of sharing
the superabundance of its being: bonum diffusiυum sui est ("good is
diffusive of itself). If that were so, then the divine freedom in creation
would be entirely "natural" to the One. I say that this question seems
to have been left hanging for Aquinas. While the identification of
divine essence with existing would clearly rule out need, it would not
so clearly circumvent this sort of "natural overflow" of goodness*30
29. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.2 prologus.
30. Norman Kretzmann's articles to this effect corroborate the fact that this
remains an issue for Aquinas. See Kretzmann, "Goodness, Knowledge, and Inde-
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Aquinas says so himself when he indicates why "knowledge of the
divine persons [in the Trinity] is 'necessary' for us [to have] the right
idea of creation: the fact of saying that God made all things by His
Word excludes the error of those who say that God produced things
by necessity. [And] when we say that in [God] there is a procession
of love, we show that God produced creatures not because He needed
them, nor because of any other extrinsic reason, but on account of
the love of His own goodness."^1 We can use Aquίnas's response to
address our immediate question by noting that the ordered processions
of Word (Son) and of Love (Holy Spirit) in divinis certainly suffices
to meet the "spontaneous overflow of goodness" consideration of
Plotinus, and it does so in a manner utterly faithful to the pagan
philosopher's (as well as Jews' and Muslims') strictures on divine
unity. Showing that to be the case would require an excursion into
formally Christian theology inappropriate here. It should suffice to
note that Aquinas so constructed his treatment of God's triunity as
to be compatible with the twin concerns of faith and of metaphysics:
the uncompromising unity of divinity as well as the utter impossibility
of concluding to the presence of such processions in God. The first
concern is one of philosophical theology, critical to articulating "the
distinction" of God from the world; the second is a matter of faith,
identifying the domain proper to God's self-revelation.
Any metaphysical scheme may, and probably will, leave some ques-
tions hanging to which the revelatory tradition alone will be able
to give adequate response. So also will there continue to be debate
regarding which scheme better articulates that tradition. But one
thing should be beyond discussion: no tradition of faith can avoid
being elaborated from within by metaphysical notions, which alone
will be able to capture the transcendent relation of divinity to ail-that -
is. The criteria of adequacy will always be mutual, as faith seeks under-
standing, and understanding allows itself to be amplified by revelation.
There is no procrustean set of "cutters" that are themselves structured
so as to cut either side down to size. Philosophical theology must needs
terminacy in the Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas," Journal of Philosophy 80 (1983):
631-649, and "A General Problem of Creation: Why Would God Create Anything at
All?" in Being and Goodness, ed. Scott MacDonald (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1984), pp. 208-228.
31. Thomas Aquinas Summa theol. 1.32.1 ad 3.
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develop those sorts of skills which foster a dialectical confrontation
of criteria from both sides, as each side of the classical faith-reason
divide employs intelligence at the service of understanding.
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